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31. Introduction
In the last decade, the EU competition policy concerning vertical restraints (as e.g. exclusive
and selective distribution, franchising agreements or resale price maintenance), has undergone
a remarkable development. One can view it as part of a general reform of European
competition policy, which is motivated by the need for a more economics-based approach to
the assessment of competition issues. Regarding vertical restraints the EU Commission issued
a general Block Exemption Regulation in 1999, in which the conditions for exempting
vertical agreements from the prohibition of Art. 81 EC Treaty were defined. These rules are
primarily based upon efficiency-oriented neoclassical arguments. Therefore,  it came as a
surprise that in the reform of the Block Exemption Regulation on vertical agreements in the
motor vehicle industry (2002), one of the primary aims of the Commission was to stimulate
innovation concerning the distribution of cars,  which lead to rules that deviate considerably
from the general efficiency-oriented rules of the general block exemption on vertical
agreements.
Although innovation is generally accepted as one important aspect of effective competition in
European competition policy, the impact of mergers or horizontal and vertical agreements on
innovation is assessed only rarely, and in very specific cases. The Commission’s "new
approach" to apply more economic analysis somehow reinforces this development through its
emphasis on welfare-economic neoclassical reasonings, whereas innovation and dynamic
efficiency still play only a minor and widely neglected role.1 To some extent, this is also a
consequence of the general unclarified significance of innovation for competition policy.
Although some attempts exist to take innovations into account in competition policy (as e.g.
the discussion on R&D-cooperations, the "innovation market analysis" in US antitrust policy,
or the interface to intellectual property rights), a systematic integration of the innovation
dimension of competition into the application of competition laws has so far not taken place.2
Similarly, arguments from evolutionary approaches of competition and innovation economics,
which are specialized on the research of the emergence and diffusion of innovations in market
competition, are not used as assessment criteria in competition policy. In this respect, a
significant deficit can be diagnosed in the realm of competition policy.
In regard to vertical restraints, this paper shows that it is necessary and possible to enrich the
theoretical basis of competition policy by drawing on evolutionary theories of competition
and innovation economics.3 The focus of our analysis is not a critique of neoclassical
reasonings on vertical restraints. Rather, it is a thorough investigation, whether and how
evolutionary approaches can be used to derive additional, new arguments and criteria for the
competition assessment of vertical restraints. Three groups of evolutionary approaches are
applied: (1) Neo-Schumpeterian approaches to competition and innovation economics, (2)
Hayekian (or Austrian) market process theories, and (3) knowledge-based theories of the firm.
                                                
1 See, for example, the new guidelines of the EU Commission for the assessment of horizontal
mergers. For a broad review of EU competition policy concerning innovation issues, see
Temple Lang (1997).
2 For some literature dealing with the role of innovation in competition policy in various
respects, see, e.g., Jorde/Teece (1991), Glader (2001), Encaoua/Hollander (2002), and Davis
(2003).
3   Our general stance is similar to Ellig and Lin (2001). See also Jorde and Teece (1991),
Teece (1992) and Pleatsikas and Teece (2001) in particular as regards to the issues of
assessing market power in industries characterized by rapid technological change and of
analysing agreements among competitors designed to promote innovation.
4Firstly, an evolutionary perspective on market processes over vertically linked markets is
developed, which consists of several intertwined variation-selection-processes. Secondly, a
number of specific evolutionary arguments as e.g. the subjectivity of knowledge, local
knowledge, the significance of heterogeneity and variety, problems of communication and
learning, and the specific consequences of complementarities and systemic innovations, are
elaborated, which might lead to a different assessment of vertical restraints in regard to
competition and innovation. The EU competition rules on vertical restraints serves as a
example for these analyses. Although our research is still in its infancy, we can show that
from an evolutionary perspective new arguments and criteria can be developed, both for
justifying vertical restraints under certain conditions and for explaining why vertical restraints
can hamper competition, particularly regarding competition as a process of experimentation.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we briefly survey the current EU competition
assessment of vertical restraints. Section 3 develops a different theoretical perspective for the
analysis of vertical restraints from an evolutionary perspective. The main analysis takes place
in section 4, in which we investigate in detail, which specific evolutionary arguments can be
developed and applied to the assessment of particular kinds of vertical restraints. In section 5,
specific regulation problems for vertical restraints are identified from the evolutionary
perspective. Some conclusions are presented in section 6.
2. Vertical Restraints under EC Competition Law
2.1 The EC Legal Framework for Vertical Agreements
The relevant legal rule for the assessment of vertical restraints is Article 81(1) EC Treaty
prohibiting agreements that restrict competition, whereas Article 81(3) sets out exceptions, if
certain conditions are fulfilled. In particular, the agreement must contribute to improving the
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, and it
should not enable the firms to eliminate competition concerning a substantial part of the
products concerned. For alleviating the handling of exemptions, the Commission issues so-
called Block Exemption Regulations, each of them exempting a class of similar agreements
whose pro-competitive benefits are considered to outweigh their anticompetitive effects.
Agreements infringing Article 81(1) but falling outside of Block Exemptions are nevertheless
valid and fully enforceable without a prior decision by a competition authority, if they fulfil
the requirements set forth in Article 81(3). In the 1990s, the Commission started an in-depth
review of EU competition policy concerning vertical restraints, which supported a more
economics-based approach, and ended with the provision of a new framework for the
assessment of vertical restraints, consisting of the general Block Exemption Regulation No
2790/1999 and accompanying Guidelines.4 The new block exemption provisions apply in
principle to all vertical restraints - with the important exception of vertical agreements in the
motor vehicle sector.5
                                                
4 Commission Regulation of 22 December 1999, OJ L 33/21, 29.12.1999; for the results of
the review see Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in Community Competition Policy,
COM(96) 721 final, adopted by the Commission on 22. 1.1997.
5 Commission Regulation No 1400/2002 (OJ L 203/30, 01.08.2002).
52.2 The Current EC Policy on Vertical Restraints: the Assessment Criteria
The Commission's new economic approach to vertical restraints focuses on the assessment of
the effects of vertical restraints on the market with the aim of enhancing consumer welfare
and creating an efficient allocation of resources. An additional important aim is market
integration. On the whole, the Commission  supports the view that most vertical restraints
imply positive effects on efficiency, which must be balanced against any anti-competitive
effects of such vertical restraints (Art 81 as a structured “rule of reason”).
The underlying theoretical basis of this new economic approach to vertical restraints has been
largely influenced by neoclassical, efficiency-oriented reasonings, stemming in particular
from the Chicago School tradition (Telser, 1960; Posner, 1976),  transaction costs and
incomplete contracts economics (Williamson, 1979; Grossmann and Hart, 1986) as well as
modern game-theoretic industrial organization theory (Tirole, 1988). These influences have
contributed to correct the former much less positive assessment of vertical restraints and has
led to a considerable liberalization in the interpretation of the rules for exempting vertical
agreements. On the whole, it can be acknowledged that the Commission has now based its
analysis and criteria on the recent neoclassical economic reasonings on vertical restraints.6 In
the following section, the most important arguments of the Commission for balancing pro-
and anticompetitive effects of vertical restraints are presented.
Vertical restraints can be employed to reduce transaction costs or to achieve other efficiencies
between firms at different levels of the production and distribution chain. In the Guidelines on
Vertical Restraints, the Commission gives an overview of some possible justifications for
vertical restraints. They comprise the solution of free-rider problems, for example when one
distributor tries to benefit from the sales efforts of another distributor. Vertical restraints, like
exclusive distribution, can help to solve the potential problem of under-investment. Hold-up
problems may also cause under-investment, e.g. when a component manufacturer does not
commit the necessary client-specific investments in equipment. A possible solution may be an
obligation not to purchase the component from third parties ("single branding") for a period of
time. In the recent Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) (OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, pp.
97-118), the Commission highlights a broad range of efficiency gains from horizontal and
vertical agreements, which allow firms to perform a particular task at lower cost or with
higher added value for consumers ("qualitative efficiency").
Nevertheless, vertical restraints can also lead to anti-competitive effects. The Commission
identifies four types of negative anti-competitive effects, which may result from vertical
restraints: foreclosure by raising barriers to entry, reduction of inter-brand competition
(including facilitation of collusion, both explicit and tacit), reduction of intra-brand
competition, and creation of obstacles to market integration. In the Commission’s view,
however, these negative effects can only emerge, if the undertakings hold a certain degree of
market power. The main reason is that the profits of the vertical structure resulting from an
efficiency-enhancing vertical restraint are more likely to benefit consumers in the form of
reduced prices or better quality, if strong competition from other suppliers of goods exists. If,
however, the vertical structure holds a sufficient degree of market power, it will tend to
absorb those efficiency gains in the form of extra profits.
                                                
6 See, for example, Rey/Caballero (1996), OECD (1994), Dobson and Waterson (1996), and
Motta (2004: 302-410).
6This shows that competition analysis of vertical restraints under Article 81 is mostly centred
on the demonstration of efficiencies and on the ascertainment of possible indicators of market
power, such as the market position of the supplier and of competitors, and the presence of
entry barriers. Accordingly, at the heart of Block Exemption Regulation No 2790/1999 we
find the presumption that, in the absence of market power, the procompetitive (efficiency)
gains of vertical restraints outweigh any anticompetitive effects. In particular, the above
mentioned  regulation creates a "safe harbour" for vertical restraints undergone by suppliers
whose market share does not exceed 30%. Below this market share, vertical agreements are
always exempted. Only a small number of vertical restraints, such as resale price
maintenance, certain forms of market partitioning by territory or by customer, and restrictions
of active or passive sales to end users by members of a selective distribution network7 are
seen as having nearly always anticompetitive effects ("hardcore restrictions") and are,
therefore, generally prohibited ("per se rule").
2.3 Vertical Agreements in the Motor Vehicle Sector: Discovering the Innovation
Dimension?
Shortly after the EU Commission had finalized its general analytical framework for the
assessment of vertical restrictions, a critical review of the competition policy for the motor
vehicle sector took place, which led to a new sector-specific Block Exemption Regulation (No
1400/2002). What perhaps is most remarkable about this newer policy is the fact that here
specific competition rules on vertical restraints appeared necessary in order to remedy the lack
of competition among distribution formats in the motor vehicle retail sector. In fact, almost
every car manufacturer in the EU employed the same distribution system, namely qualitative
selective distribution combined with exclusive territories and innovation at the retail level was
practically switched off. 8 One of the main aims of the EU Commission was, therefore, to
stimulate innovation on the motor vehicle retail market, and the rules on vertical restraints in
this industry were crafted to a large extent in accordance with this aim (Vezzoso, 2004).9
The competition rules for vertical restraints in the motor vehicle sector are  significantly more
restrictive than the general rules for vertical restraints. Thus, the range of permissible vertical
restraints is considerably limited, independently from the parties' market share. For instance,
selective distribution cannot be cumulated with exclusive territories, which implies that the
car manufacturers have to choose between these two retail forms. Moreover, retailers cannot
be obliged to provide repair and maintenance services to the cars they sell, but they can
delegate these services to independent, approved repairers. This is supported by the obligation
of the manufacturers to supply necessary technical information, diagnostic equipment and
tools, and training to independent repairers. Additionally, there are provisions for
                                                
7 Other vertical restrictions that are excluded from the coverage of the Block Exemption
Regulation are non-compete obligations, the duration of which is indefinite or exceeds five
years.
8 This emerged from special  surveys conducted by the EU Commission and other national
competition authorities, in particular in the UK.
9 Another aim referred to the problem of large differences of car prices between different
member states.
7safeguarding retailers' economic independence from the manufacturer.10 Finally, the
maintenance of an independent market for spare parts is supported by specific rules.
The interesting implication of this reform is that in the motor vehicle sector the Commission
pursues a strategy of supporting a greater vertical dis-integration in the vertical chain in order
to stimulate more innovations in the retail format, and more competition in the vertical chain
generally. As a consequence, the efficiency considerations usually linked to the existence of
vertical restraints have been held less relevant. Since it cannot be argued that the specific
conditions in the motor vehicle industry differ so much from other industries that so different
specific rules are necessary, the question arises, whether the general theoretical approach of
the Commission with its focus on efficiency considerations can adequately deal with
innovation issues. It is true that in this general theoretical approach the impact of vertical
restraints on the process by which innovations (of retail formats) emerge and diffuse is not
taken into account. The sector-specific rules of the Commission aiming at promoting
innovations of retail formats in the motor-vehicle industry, however, are only adhoc-rules,
which are not derived from an integrated theoretical framework about the impact of vertical
restraints on innovation.
3. The Different Perspective of Evolutionary and Innovation Economics on Vertical
Relations
3.1 Overview
Since evolutionary economics, dynamic theories of competition, and innovation economics
can provide important insights into the functioning of competition as an innovation process,
the question arises, what arguments can be contributed by those approaches for the
competition assessment of vertical restraints. We would like to pose the question for the
impact of vertical restraints on competition and innovation in both ways:
(1) To what extent can evolutionary economics provide additional arguments, why vertical
restraints might be necessary for solving specific problems, and therefore can have positive
effects on competition and innovation?
(2) Can evolutionary economics provide arguments, why vertical restraints might have anti-
competitive effects, in particular, lead to negative effects on innovation processes?
We will proceed in two steps: In this section 3, the different general perspective on market
processes over several market stages and vertical relationships is shown that emerges through
the application of evolutionary theories on competition and innovation. In section 4, a number
of particular evolutionary arguments are developed for the assessment of vertical restraints
and are applied to specific kinds of vertical restraints.
                                                
10 For example, the dealers' ability is protected to transfer their rights and obligations to other
dealers authorised to sell the same brand, and it is facilitated that dealers sell simultaneously
different brands ("multi-branding").
83.2 Evolutionary Market and Innovation Processes over Vertically Linked Markets
3.2.1 Neo-Schumpeterian Innovation Economics and Hayekian Market Process
Theories
The neoclassical analysis of competition in vertically linked markets is based upon traditional
(mostly game-theoretic) microeconomic equilibrium theory. In contrast, we want to apply
Neo-Schumpeterian and Austrian theories for developing an alternative theoretical
framework. Neo-Schumpeterian competition and innovation economics encompasses
dynamic theories of competition (see e.g. Clark 1961, Heuss 1965, Kerber 1994) and modern
evolutionary innovation economics (see e.g. Nelson/Winter 1982, Dosi 1988, Andersen 1994,
Metcalfe 1998). Both are based upon basic ideas of Schumpeter. Important insights from this
perspective are the endogeneity of technical progress, the wide scope of innovations (product,
process, and organizational innovations), the importance of dynamic efficiency in comparison
to (static) efficiency, the dynamic process character of competition (as an innovation-
imitation-process), the he terogeneity of firms, and the possibility of analyzing market
processes as evolutionary processes of variation and selection of products and technologies,
using concepts from biological evolution theory. The latter implies the recognition of the
importance of variety as necessary input for market processes of experimentation, leading to
accumulation of knowledge and economic development.
Hayekian and Austrian evolutionary market process theories start from Hayek's insistence on
the importance of the "knowledge problem" (Hayek 1945, 1948, 1978, Kirzner 1997), both on
the level of individuals (and firms) and on the level of public policy. This also encompasses
the subjectivity of knowledge (which implies a variety in the judgement of individuals
thereby increasing heterogeneity), the widespread existence of specific local (and tacit)
knowledge. Most influential was his claim that competition must be viewed as a "discovery
procedure" (Hayek 1948, 1978), which has been connected to Popper's evolutionary theory of
growth of knowledge. On this basis a number of contributions could emerge that stress and
analyze the knowledge-generating character of competition and see market processes as an
evolutionary process of experimentation (Streit and Wegner 1992, Loasby 1993, Harper 1996,
Kerber 1997, Kerber and Saam 2001). From this perspective, competition can be seen as a
process of trial and error, in which firms create and test conjectures or hypotheses about
preferences, products, and technologies, and where the market provides a feedback
mechanism, which of these hypotheses are superior and should be selected by imitation
(market test).
3.2.2 Evolutionary Variation and Selection Processes in Vertically Linked Markets
Let us assume an industry with a number of firms, producing a consumer good, and, in the
downstream market, retailers who buy these products and sell them to the consumers. This
situation implies simultaneously three different horizontal competition processes, which are
intertwined in a complex way. Each of them can be viewed as an experimental discovery
processes and be described as a process of variation and selection (see in more detail Kerber
1989, 1991):
(1) The firms on the producer level compete with their products and product innovations. Due
to the knowledge problems of the producers these products have to be interpreted as fallible
hypotheses about the best way to fulfil the preferences of the consumers. Ultimately, the
9consumers act as selectors who decide, which of these hypotheses are the relatively best ones
with regard to their preferences. However, it should be noted that, first of all, the retailers
select which items they include in their product assortment ("gatekeeper" position), and the
consumers can choose only from those products, which are offered by the retailers. Therefore,
we have a double, sequential selection process, first a preselection by the retailers, and on this
basis, the final selection by the consumers. Although the retailers have incentives to select
products the consumers want, one must keep in mind that retailers have limited knowledge
about the preferences of the consumers, and, therefore, can make erroneous decisions.
(2) Furthermore, the retailers compete with their services for the consumers. This competition
process is also a process of experimentation, in which the retailers search for the best
combination of prices, range of products, location, style of the outlet, service to the customer
etc. (Nyberg, 1998). While the producers experiment with new products, innovations are
equally important on the level of retailing, leading to new distribution formats, as e.g.
supermarkets or, recently, distribution via the internet. With regard to this process of variation
in retailing, the consumers are the selectors and determine the outcome of this market test,
leading to imitation and/or innovation activities by other retailers.
(3) The retailers, however, do not only compete with their services for the consumers, but
they also offer more or less attractive distribution channels to the producers. The innovation
of new distribution formats could lower the costs for producers to reach their target group of
potential customers. Depending on the specific product, the retailers can be very
heterogeneous as distribution channels from the perspective of the producers. Retailers, which
are more attractive in this respect than others, will be able to bargain for better conditions, as
e.g. higher rebates, and this kind of price differentiation will give these retailers a competitive
advantage over their competitors. Therefore the retailers have incentives for innovative
improvements of their performance as distribution channels. In this evolutionary competition
process, the retailers are the generator of variations and the producers are the selectors.
In addition to these three horizontal competition processes, there are also processes of vertical
competition between the firms on the production and retailing level, because retailers can take
on functions, which were previously exercised by producers, such as the branding of products
or advertising, or, vice versa, producers can fulfil classical functions of retailing, such as shelf
replenishing. What activities are best fulfilled by producers or by retailers (division of labour
between the different levels) is itself an object of innovative experimentation in competition
processes - up to the possible extreme consequence of full vertical integration between both
levels (see also Mahnke 2001). For example, by finding better ways of bundling the activities
of firms - perhaps due to the discovering of new complementarities of resources -
organizational innovations in vertical chains can occur. Those innovations can emerge
independent from product and retail service innovations ("evolution of the value chain
structure", see Jacobides, 2004: 40, italics in original)
This evolutionary theoretical framework implies that vertical relationships between producers
and retailers are part of complex market processes, in which several competitive trial and
error-processes take place at the same time and possibly influence each other, and in which
the same firms are simultaneously suppliers that create and test new products or services
(variation), and selectors of the products or services of the firms in upstream and downstream
markets. Additionally, the quality of the selection decisions of the firms is itself part of their
performance offered to others. Therefore, it seems the analysis of vertical restraints elaborated
within the neoclassical equilibrium framework needs to be supplemented by evolutionary
insights. The question is what the effects of vertical restraints are within this different
10
perspective of a complex evolutionary structure of experimental market processes over
several vertically linked market stages, which is based upon Neo-Schumpeterian and
Hayekian theories of competition and innovation economics.
3.3 Knowledge-Based Theories of the Firm: another View on Vertical Restraints
Evolutionary approaches can also lead to a different view on vertical restraints, if we analyse
them from the perspective of the theories of organization. Incentive theory (Tirole, 1988),
incomplete contract theory (Grossmann and Hart, 1986), and transaction costs theory
(Williamson, 1979) had a considerable and valuable influence on the competition assessment
of vertical restraints, primarily by focusing on the problems of information asymmetry, ex-
post non-verifiability of variables central to contracting, hold-up, and externalities. However,
the above mentioned approaches have neglected knowledge-related issues like learning,
communication and innovation (Foss, 1999; Nooteboom, 2002; Wuyts/ Colombo/ Dutta/
Nooteboom, 2004). According to the organization theories based on capabilities
(Richardson,1972; Silver,1984; Langlois/Foss, 1998), resources (Penrose, 1959; Conner,
1991; Conner and Prahalad, 1996), dynamic capabilities (Teece/Pisano, 1994) and cognition
(Nooteboom, 1997) firms exist and develop according to their idiosyncratic capabilities
(skills, tacit knowledge). Therefore, the basic idea of these knowledge-based theories of the
firm is that the most essential characteristic of the existence and the boundaries of firms
should be found in the differential knowledge-bases of firms.
Firms are seen as taking advantage of complementarities among assets and are made
idiosyncratic through their firm-specific knowledge. Accordingly, the literature analysing
collaborations between firms under a learning and knowledge perspective focuses on the
issues of similarity between competences and interdependency between activities – and the
problems related to it. Many contributions stress the importance of multiple relations in order
to get access to complementary knowledge-bases the firm does not possess ("cross-firm
economy of learning", Nooteboom, 1992), but also the need for intensive co-operations and
trust between partners in order to allow for the knowledge to be transmitted (Håkansson,
1989) - and not only to solve opportunism-induced transaction problems. Thanks to specific
forms of collaboration transaction costs can not only be avoided or other incentive-related
problems resolved, but novel opportunities, novel combinations of inputs or completely new
products or services may also emerge (Powell/Koput/Smith-Doerr, 1996; von Hippel, 1994).
In particular, knowledge-based theories of the firm can help to understand the possible role of
vertical agreements for the transfer of knowledge between firms and the development of
innovations.
4. Evolutionary Arguments for Assessing Vertical Restraints
4.1 Subjectivism, Heterogeneity, and Local Knowledge
In neoclassical models of competition in vertically linked market stages the firms mostly have
perfect knowledge and are homogeneous. From an evolutionary market process perspective,
however, it has to be assumed that the firms on up- and downstream markets are usually
heterogeneous and have subjective, fallible, local (and often even tacit) knowledge. Since
there often is high uncertainty in regard to the future preferences of consumers and since
subjective knowledge is largely influenced by one's own experience, the firms in up- and
11
downstream markets will have a considerable variety of assessments about the most
promising business strategies on the producer and the retailing level. This also follows from
the specific local or tacit knowledge of firms in the vertical chain, which is unknown to
others, and often cannot even be communicated (Minkler, 1993). Therefore the Hayekian
insight that "knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and space" is widely dispersed
among individuals (Hayek 1945) is also true for the network of firms that cooperate within a
vertical chain. Additionally, the more heterogeneous the knowledge bases are, the more
differentiated the market offers for products and services are likely to be ("cognitive distance"
as a key to diversity, Nooteboom, 1999). As a consequence, heterogeneity is also crucial in
the relation between firms in the vertical chain, e.g. between firms on the producer and the
retailing levels (Windsperger, 2002). Producers (with their products) are heterogeneous for
retailers as well as retailers are heterogeneous for producers as distribution channels (Kerber,
1989).
The complexity of both the knowledge structure and of the heterogeneity of firms in vertical
chains have not been sufficiently taken into account in neoclassical analyses of vertical
restraints. What are, for example, the consequences of local knowledge of retailers for vertical
restraints? It is realistic to assume that the demand conditions for products vary considerably
throughout a country and that local or regional retailers have better knowledge about the
preferences of their customers and the local market conditions. Vertical restraints that
producers impose on the retailers of their products, and, therefore, restrict their discretionary
scope for deciding freely on their own business strategies, imply that the retailers cannot fully
utilize their local knowledge,11 which might lead to an overall performance that is neither
optimal for the producers and retailers nor for the consumers. This problem can emerge in
regard to most kinds of vertical restraints, as, e.g., resale price maintenance or the sets of
rules, which retailers have to accept in systems of exclusive or selective distribution. If it
would be easy for the retailers to communicate the local knowledge to the producers, and for
the producers to verify it, then this local knowledge could be utilized in the central decision-
making process of the producer, and the above mentioned inefficiencies  would be avoided.
However, due to its often tacit and not communicable as well as mostly not verifiable
character, most of local knowledge cannot be centralised, and is, therefore, lost for the
decisions of the producers. To a large degree this problem resembles Hayek's thesis of the
impossibility of the centralisation of   knowledge in society, which he developed for showing
the superiority of decentralised market systems compared to planned economies. His main
point that the freedom of individuals in decentralised systems allows for a better utilisation of
local knowledge is also relevant in vertical chains. Therefore, the problem of vertical
restraints can also be seen from the perspective of the general discussion on the optimal
degree of centralisation or decentralisation. Here it is also a well-accepted insight that more
decentralised systems allow for a better utilisation of local knowledge.
What are the policy implications for the relevance of local knowledge of the firms in vertical
chains? An obvious answer seems to be that as long as the producer recognizes the relevance
of the retailer’s local knowledge, the former might have incentives for not imposing so far-
reaching restrictions on the latter’s market performance. "Wise" producers might leave their
                                                
11 This is also true for other capabilities and skills they possess. See also Denozza (1988) on
the information the retailer would be able to acquire about consumers’ needs and decision
processes, and transfuse into its buying decisions, if the retailer would have sufficient
freedom of experimentation as regards its relationship with the consumers.
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retailers the necessary discretionary scope for utilizing their local knowledge.12 However, it
remains unclear whether producers really recognize the relevance of local knowledge, which
might be controversial between producers and retailers, and whether the producers have
undistorted incentives to include all effects on retailers and consumers in their decisions on
the extent of the discretionary scope of retailers. Therefore, one can assume that in many
cases a certain negative efficiency effect through vertical restraints might emerge due to an
under-utilization of their local knowledge. Of course, in many cases, this negative effect can
be over-compensated by positive efficiency effects through these vertical restraints, e.g. by
the solving of free-riding or externality problems. Nevertheless, the decisive conclusion is that
a comprehensive competition assessment of vertical restraints should also take into account
this potential negative effect of vertical restraits due to the often great relevance of local
knowledge in vertical chains.
An interesting conclusion from this argumentation is the strengthening of a somewhat old-
fashioned principle in competition policy. Particularly in German competition law, but also
for a long time in EU competition law, the protection of the freedom of the retailers (as the
application of the more general tenet of entrepreneurial freedom) has been an important
principle that influenced the assessment of vertical restraints.13 From a purely neoclassical
efficiency perspective this principle seems to be legalistic and superfluous, but from an
evolutionary perspective that emphasizes the relevance of subjective and local knowledge, the
maintenance of decentralised decision-making might get an additional significance. In the
next section we will see why this freedom may also be crucial for the workability of
competition as a process of experimentation.
4.2 Experimentation, Openness, and Variety
4.2.1 Vertical Restraints and Experimentation
Darwinian processes of growth of knowledge require variation, because without variety the
selection processes cannot unfold its effect of identifying superior ("fitter") solutions and
ensure their spreading through increased replication or imitation. Therefore, one of the most
important results of evolutionary innovation economics is the relevance of a continuous
production of variety. In section 3.2.2, it was shown that in vertically linked markets there are
several intertwined competition processes that work as processes of experimentation with new
hypotheses about products, services, distributions formats, complementarities between
resources, etc., and their selection by firms or consumers on the other market side. From this
perspective the generation of innovations and variety within the vertical chain is a necessary
precondition for ensuring that the experimental character of market competition can work and
leads to  a process of accumulation of knowledge. What can be the effects of vertical
restraints on this experimental character of competition?
First of all, we must emphasize that often vertical restraints are necessary for carrying out
organizational innovations, i.e. new forms of organizing activities and transactions. These
                                                
12 Windsperger (2002), for example, suggests in the context of franchise agreements, that the
more important is the franchisee's outlet-specific know-how for the creation of residual
income, the more residual rights are likely to be allocated to the franchisee.
13 The general normative background is that competition law should also protect the "freedom
to compete" ("Wettbewerbsfreiheit"). This was particularly emphasized by the Freiburg
School of Law and Economics (Ordoliberalism); see Möschel (1989).
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organizational innovations can  contribute to the  reduction of  transaction costs, the solution
of  incentive problems or can help organizing processes of learning and communication
between vertically linked firms in upstream and downstream markets. Most of these
organizational innovations require specific contractual arrangements, which might often
involve some kinds of restrictions on the behaviour of at least one partner, qualifying them as
vertical restraints. This implies that in order to generate knowledge about the efficacy of those
organizational innovations, some experimentation with vertical restraints may also be
necessary.
Nevertheless, we must also pose the opposite question, to what extent vertical restraints can
hamper innovative activities. By definition, vertical restraints restrict the freedom of firms to
act independently from others. Therefore, vertical restraints can have a substantial impact on
the degree to which the heterogeneity of firms transforms into a variety of offers from which
other agents can choose. For instance, in a qualitative selective distribution system, which
imposes retailers to perform a bundle of predetermined post-sale services, distributors are
prevented from generating their own hypotheses about appropriate distribution services (on
the basis of their subjective knowledge and skills). Conversely, the banning of that vertical
restriction would have possibly allowed retailers to develop a variety of alternative
distribution services,14 thereby exploring a wider variety of hypotheses how to meet
consumers' needs. Therefore, vertical restraints can restrict the freedom to experiment and can
reduce the amount of variety that is being generated and tested in the market.
Theoretically this problem can be analysed as follows. If the firms on the two levels are
entirely independent, i.e. there are no vertical restraints between producers and retailers, the
firms on both levels can experiment and select independently from each other - on the basis of
their own subjective knowledge. In the case of vertical integration as the extreme case of
vertical restraints, in which two firms in the vertical chain merge, only one firm decides on all
aspects of production and distribution. In this case, there is only one process of
experimentation, in which vertically integrated firms test one large bundle of hypotheses, both
on the optimal product and the optimal distribution. This has two consequences: On the one
hand, the number of independent sources of innovation is considerably reduced in comparison
with the vertically disintegrated case, leading to a lower level of variety. On the other hand,
the quality of the selection of hypotheses can decrease, because the larger the bundles of
hypotheses tested in the market by the firms, the less information is fed back from the market
about the quality of particular hypotheses.15 It follows that firms are going to  learn less about
the quality of their hypotheses from the market test.16 Consequently, there might be a positive
effect on the efficacy of competition as a discovery procedure, if there are two independent
processes of experimentation on two different vertical levels, in which more but smaller
bundles of hypotheses are tested, than if there are less but larger bundles of hypotheses as in
the case of vertically integrated firms. To a lesser degree this is also true in the case of vertical
restraints, in which the freedom to experiment is restricted only to a certain extent.
Therefore, vertical restraints can also reduce the positive effects of competition as a discovery
procedure, thereby hampering processes of innovation and imitation in the vertical chain. Of
                                                
14 A similar conclusion was reached by the UK Competition Commission (2000).
15 Dosi and Nelson (1994) also point to the complexity of the unit of selection.
16 For an analysis of (1) the positive effects of a larger number of firms and (2) the negative
effects of a larger bundle of hypotheses, which simultaneously are tested in the market, in
regard to the knowledge-generating effect in horizontal competition as processes of
experimentation, see Kerber and Saam (2001).
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course, there are good arguments why vertical integration and vertical restraints might
increase efficiency and even innovation (see section 4.4 for evolutionary arguments to that
effect), but the contention is that such a positive effect for the knowledge-generating aspect of
competition might exist, if through less vertical restraints the extent of the freedom to
experiment and, therefore, the possibility for generating more variety increases.
This  reasoning can also be related to the well-known discussion on inter-brand vs. intra-
brand competition. From a Chicago-type perspective, a well-functioning inter-brand
competition among producers can substitute intra-brand competition among retailers. In
section 2, it was shown that the EC policy on vertical restraints largely subscribes to this
conclusion, insofar as the EU Commission considers the protection of inter-brand competition
much more important than the protection of intra-brand competition. As a consequence, the
general presumption of the EC policy is that, in the absence of market power on the upstream
market, the procompetitive gains of vertical restraints are considered to prevail over
anticompetitive effects. However, from our evolutionary perspective a much more complex
and differentiated picture unfolds: The elimination of intra-brand competition among retailers
might lead to the loss of the positive knowledge effects from experimentation on the retailing
level, even if there is sufficient inter-brand competition among the producers. Thus, an
evolutionary analysis suggests that inter-brand competition cannot substitute entirely intra-
brand competition.  This negative effect of lacking intra-brand competition through certain
kinds of vertical restraints will be aggravated, if we consider additionally the existence of
heterogeneity and local knowledge on the retailing level (see section 4.1).
4.2.2 Market Entry, Ease of Exit, and Non-Compete Obligations
How is market experimentation influenced by the effects of vertical restraints upon the market
entry conditions? The usual question is whether new firms are able to enter the market within
a short time at a sufficient scale in order to eliminate or effectively restrict independent
pricing of incumbents. Implicitly it is assumed that incumbents and entrants have the same
knowledge. However, from an evolutionary perspective, we can assume heterogeneity of
knowledge between incumbents and entrants, which can make entry easier or more difficult
(Barney, 2001) than from a neoclassical perspective. Nevertheless, in any case, a particular
problem might be that a potential entrant who wants to try out a new (and so far unknown)
product needs to find retailers on the downstream market willing to distribute it. This can be
difficult due to the high uncertainty about the market success of this new product. Therefore,
a higher number of firms on the downstream market may be helpful for the innovator, given
the substantial "dynamic transaction costs" of finding somebody willing to experiment with
something new (Silver, 1984). Also the more heterogeneous the firms on the other market
side are, the higher the probability is that some firm might be willing to try out the new offer.
However, if a substantial part of retailers are already tied to other manufacturers, it can be
very difficult for an entrant to find such partners. It follows that ve rtical restraints, particularly
if they are wide-spread in the market, can seriously restrain the capacity of the system to
endogenously generate innovations, because market entry and, thus, experimentation might be
more difficult. The policy of the EU Commission to be more restrictive in the case of a
vertical restraint being applied by most firms in the market can, therefore, be substantiated by
these evolutionary considerations.17
                                                
17 See Article 6 and especially 8 of Reg.2790/1999, under which the Commission is even
entitled to remove the benefit of the Block Exemption Regulation, when parallel networks of
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The basic insight that market experimentation with innovations requires enough firms on the
other market side implies also a high degree of flexibility for switching transaction partners.
This is relevant for the competition assessment of contractual clauses in vertical arrangements
that limit the ease of exit from an ongoing relationship, make it difficult to engage in
relationships with more than one partner at the same time, or oblige to refrain from
competition for a certain period of time after terminating the contractual relationship (non-
compete obligations). For instance, one may question if the assessment of vertical restraints
should be biased in favour of vertical restraints because of relationship-specific investments
(opportunism problem), which make termination much more difficult (see Guidelines on
Vertical Restraints, para 119, pt.9). Also a more restrictive approach to socalled single-
branding could be worth considering. A similar reasoning could apply to non-compete
obligations. According to the general Block Exemption Regulation they are enforceable, if
they do not exceed five years, although extraordinary efficiencies can justify even longer non-
compete obligations. Concerns could be raised that this period might be too long, especially in
highly dynamic sectors. Non-compete obligations or qualitative restrictions of the retailer's
behaviour can also set restrictions or limits on vertical competition between producers and
retailers. This can lead to an impediment for the experimental character of market competition
in regard to the proper delineation of the different market stages. Although it is true that all of
these clauses can help to solve particular efficiency problems (e.g. opportunism problems),
one should realize that they also reduce the flexibility within vertical chains. From an
evolutionary perspective, the flexibility of firms is crucial for the openness and the
workability of experimentation processes in markets. Therefore, the competition assessment
of vertical restraints should not only take into account their positive effects on static
efficiency (as current EC competition rules do), but also potential negative effects on
flexibility and innovation (dynamic efficiency).
4.2.3 The Reform of the EU Rules for the Motor Vehicle Industry: An Application of
Evolutionary Arguments?
As we have seen above, the reform of the EU competition rules for the motor vehicle industry
was motivated by the aim to promote innovation and diversity of offerings in the distribution
of cars (see section 2.3; Block Exemption Regulation 1400/2002). Cars’ retailing in the EU
was characterized by an almost uniform employment of a system of selective distribution
requiring each dealer to perform a certain amount of activities like promotion and repairing,
and assigning to each dealer an exclusive territory. Independent retailers like supermarkets or
internet operators did not fulfil the requirements to become an approved retailer, leading to a
lack of competition among different distribution formats. The basic strategy of the reform can
be described as supporting a kind of vertical dis-integration by requiring an unbundling of
activities and strengthening the independence of dealers from the car manufacturers. One of
the measures is that distributors can no longer be obliged to perform the car repair service
themselves but can contract-out this specific function to approved operators.18 However, other
specific rules also aim at a greater independence of the firms in the vertical chain, leading to a
                                                                                                                                                        
vertical restraints cover more than 50% of a relevant market or impede access to the relevant
market or competition therein.
18 Interestingly, though, this unbundling of activities was not allowed according to the
previous Block Exemption Regulation for the motor vehicle sector, so that, the EU
Commission is also amending its previous policy.
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greater separation between car manufacturers, car dealers, repairers,  as well as independent
spare part suppliers.
From the results of our analysis in section 4.2.1, one can see that the Commission’s newer
policy approach might have positive effects on innovation. The retailers, for example, can
now find out themselves, whether, in their specific case, outsourcing the repair services to an
independent operator would be an efficient choice. The heterogeneity of retailers in regard to
their knowledge and skills includes that they could be differently competent at performing
this function. This could give rise to vertical rivalry between dealers and repairers, competing
on the allocation of this specific task within the vertical chain.  However, one can also see it
as a general process of experimentation, whether both services should be provided by the
same firm, e.g. due to some similarities of knowledge and skills, or better be offered by
different firms due to the differences in the necessary knowledge bases. Another advantage of
this unbundling is that entry barriers are lowered, because new firms need not offer
simultaneously distribution and repair services.
The strengthening of dealers’ independence might be a step to a long-term development, in
which really independent dealers (perhaps in form of chains or by including cars into the
assortment of other retailers) emerge that can develop their own innovative distribution
formats and test them on the market. However, it is an open question, whether the reform of
the Commission is sufficient to break up the traditional distribution structures in the motor
vehicle industry. 19 Moreover, it is not entirely clear, whether the overall effects of the reform
are positive, because this kind of (regulatory forced) vertical dis-integration within the
vertical chain can also lead to negative effects, provided that cars as highly complex products
might need a network of closely co-operating partners, as also the Commission concedes.
That this can also be a problem from the evolutionary perspective, will be shown in section
4.4.
4.3 Learning, Communication, and Innovation
Knowledge-based theories of the firm could provide additional views on the economic
rationale of vertical arrangements, in particular focusing on the issues of learning and
innovation. Vertical restraints might help firms deal with the "dynamic" transaction costs
(Nooteboom, 1999) of learning by interaction (Lundvall, 1988) with other parties. A firm’s
knowledge can be very difficult to articulate (partly due to its tacit character) and transmit to
other economic agents. For once the parties share enough knowledge, they will be able to
understand each other ("syntax and grammar", Argyres, 1999). Because of their specialization
in different knowledge domains (or because of acquired "mental models"), firms might have a
limited ability to absorb and process information coming from outside. Organizational devices
could represent a viable means of overcoming at least some of these difficulties. The
provision of credible exclusivity commitments between firms can be crucial to establishing a
climate supportive of a knowledge transfer - especially in regard to "know-how", which by its
very nature is difficult to codify (Lundvall, 1996). This can even go beyond what would
normally be necessary to cope with free-riding, hold-up problems or even knowledge spill-
over risks.
                                                
19 For a much more detailed analysis of the reform of the EU competition rules in the motor
vehicle industry from an evolutionary perspective, see Vezzoso (2004). For other critical
reviews of this reform see, e.g. Buelens, 2003.
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Considering the innovation potential of vertical arrangements could also provide interesting
insights. Thanks to close arrangements with firms possessing complementary competences,
changes in the category of thought and category structure can take place ("second-order
learning", Bateson, 1972), thus enabling firms to innovate and grow in the long run. An
additional, important insight is that, by taking part in various forms of interaction, the firm
may gain access to new cognitive frames, and, thus, avoid being stuck in routine behaviour
(Mytelka, 1991). Reducing cognitive distance through the establishment of a close
relationship between the firms can improve the possibility of exploring new resource
combinations, because in particular it could become less difficult to convince the other party
to try out something new. 20 Conversely, it can be argued that a certain amount of
communication costs could be necessary under the viewpoint of evolutionary competition. In
fact, it is through the establishment of the "optimal cognitive distance" that relationships-
endogeneous innovations can arise (not too close, for a higher novelty value of partner's
knowledge, but also not too distant, for the improvement of mutual understanding,
Wuyts/Colombo/Dutta/Nooteboom, 2004).
Thus, from an evolutionary perspective, the competition assessment of vertical restraints
should ideally comprise an inquiry about their effects on learning and communication
processes. For example, detailed contingent contracts, which are efficient from the viewpoint
of the transaction costs theory, could prove to yield negative effects on vertical collaborations
in regard to learning and innovation, whereas close relationships not justified by asymmetry
of information, hold-up risks, etc. could make sense under the viewpoint of fostering
knowledge transfer (especially of the know-how type) and innovation. Therefore, a
challenging task for competition policy could be to try to combine insights from the
knowledge-based and the governance approaches, perhaps similarly to the analysis of
networks (Williamson, 1999; Nooteboom and Gilsing, 2004).
4.4 Complementarity, Vertical Restraints, and Systemic Innovations
4.4.1 Complementarities and Vertical Restraints
The assumption that there may be complementarities between resources and activities is at the
core of the resource-based theory of the firm, and it is also a well-known theme within the
contract-based theory of the firm (Hart and Moore, 1990) Although production can be broken
down into various stages in vertical chains, as long as complementarities exist, social
interactions not mediated through the market can be justified.21 Thus, it may be necessary to
qualitatively coordinate the production (e.g., choice of product characteristics) with the
distribution of goods (Richardson 1972; Langlois/Robertson 1989). In this respect, the
producer’s intention to coordinate ex-ante his own activity with the distributor’s activity can
be explained by pointing not so much to problems styled in the double-marginalization-
reasoning of neoclassical economics, but to the necessity of coping with interdependencies
between activities.22This is even more so if we consider the strategic role complementary
assets play in the firms’ pursuit of a sustainable competitive advantage (Teece/Pisano 1994).
                                                
20 See Silver, 1984 and Langlois and Robertson, 1995 for this category of dynamic transaction
costs – as "the costs of persuading, negotiating, co-ordinating and teaching outside suppliers".
21 Conversely, as long as interdependence is reduced, and therefore activities do not need to
be coordinated ex-ante or internally (by way of hierarchy) markets can in principle emerge.
22 According to this theory, integration is needed when the activities to be coordinated are
highly interdependent, see Langlois and Robertson (1989).
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On the one hand, there may be "technical" interdependencies, as when one piece has to fit into
a complex mechanism (e.g. a car). On the other hand, there is what has been defined a
somewhat “tighter” form of complementarity, or closely complementary activities
(Richardson 1972). This could be a type of interdependence between activities based on the
fact that the competences and the knowledge-bases required to exercise them are similar to
each other. In this respect, there can be a complementarity between distribution and repair in
the sense that it is more effective (also cost-effective) for a single firm to perform both of
them, because their use of the same type of competence might lead to important synergies.
What could all this imply in regard to vertical arrangements? Firstly, this may offer an
explanation for ex-ante qualitative coordination (e.g., selective qualitative distribution), which
is more clearly focused on the important dimension of complementarities between
competences. Secondly, it could shed some light on the strategic role of vertical arrangements
insofar as they allow for the discovery23of complementarities (and synergies) between
activities and competences on which firms will, eventually, base their competitive advantage.
4.4.2 Systemic Innovations, Vertical Leadership, and Vertical Restraints
Complementarities can also restrict a firm's ability to innovate independently, because a
change in one component of a complex (technical) system may require that other components
are also modified. In those cases, innovations would be "systemic", i.e., they can be realized
only in conjunction with simultaneous innovations in complementary activities (i.e., related
technologies).24 Therefore, a coordination mechanism for the innovation processes in the
vertical chain is required. Of course, the firms can make mutual adjustments between their
innovations, but this might take a long time and requires high communication costs (Silver,
1984). Another option is that one firm (or a very small group of firms) can exercise the role of
system leadership or vertical (innovation) leadership within the vertical chain. The leader's
task would be to coordinate the innovative endeavours of all members of the vertical chain in
order to ensure the compatibility among all different activities contributing to the overall
performance. Still another possibility is that the vertical leader fulfils the task of designing the
innovation of the overall performance alone and requires the other members of the vertical
chain to adapt their activities accordingly. A further variant is that the vertical leader uses his
control over the system’s overall design configuration, to define clearly interfaces between the
activities, which divide the whole chain in compatible modules. As long as the firms respect
the common interfaces, they are able to innovate independently from each other (implying
innovation competition), because they ensure the compatibility of the modules (and, therefore,
solve the coordination problem).25
Most of these options for the coordination of innovative activities in the case of "systemic"
innovations may require some kind of vertical restraints, which can be seen as instruments by
which the hub of a complex system can exercise its coordinating role. In this respect, vertical
restraints can further be seen as   supporting  the emergence of (systemic) innovations.
However, it should be noted that these vertical restraints, as in other cases seen above, reduce
                                                
23 That synergies between resources are the object of a discovery process is also stressed by
Mathews (2002).
24 The more mutually dependent actors are within a channel, the more systemic innovations
will tend to be. This can also be the case with distribution channels (Nyberg, 1998: 77).
25 For the significance of modularity and interfaces in the theory of the firm, see Langlois
(2002).
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the positive effects of market experimentation within the vertical chain, because the
coordinating effect of vertical restraints simultaneously limits the freedom of the firms to
innovate independently. The emergence of a trade off can be suggested between the positive
effects of vertical restraints through the coordination of innovations and their negative effects
through less experimentation within the vertical chain. In fact, even if complementarities
require the coordination of innovation activities and imply a milder or stronger exercise of
vertical leadership, other members of the system are not necessarily prevented from
innovating independently, e.g. within clearly specified interfaces. It would be a task for
competition policy to search for appropriate solutions in cases in which this trade off is
relevant.26
A potentially interesting solution might be the modularization of activities, because this
allows for dynamic competition with innovations at each individual stage of a vertical chain. 27
However, modularization is feasible only as long as the interfaces between the activities can
be clearly specified (necessity of "interconnection knowledge"; Jacobides and Winter, 2003:
8).28 Particularly, if new combinations of previously unrelated activities and competences are
tried out as in phases of radical innovation, the exercise of more hierarchical forms of vertical
leadership, and, therefore, more restrictive vertical restraints, could be justified from the
perspective of competition policy. However, vertical restraints should not become the means
by which the vertically leading firm tries to unduly abuse or perpetuate its power. For
example, in very innovative environments, in which the interconnection knowledge is
constantly under challenge, the control over the system's design configuration can become an
essential precondition for the capacity of the firm to innovate its own activity. 29 Moreover,
there can be substantial benefits (i.e. in terms of the appropriation of the network's rent) in
exercising the role of the vertical innovation leader (Bresnahan, 1999). This can lead to fierce
competition among system members as to acquiring the role of the vertical leader. Since this
can be another example of effective vertical competition (here for fulfilling the functions of
the vertical leader), competition policy should ensure that competition for vertical leadership
remains possible, and should take measures in order to preserve the capacity of firms on the
succumbing side of the market or market entrants (Bresnahan, 1999: 198) to challenge that
supremacy of the vertically leading firm.
5. The Problem of Regulating Vertical Restraints from an Evolutionary Perspective
What specific problems can be identified for the regulation of vertical restraints from the
perspective of evolutionary economics? Important acknowledgements are that due to the
openness of market processes it is not possible to predict the outcome of competition as a
"discovery procedure" (Hayek 1978). This is closely linked to the Hayekian problem that
government agencies have fundamental knowledge problems concerning intervening
                                                
26 To some extent this can also be the case in the motor vehicle industry.
27 This could also be the firm’s interest, if it is true that "a firm is better off and can extract
more value when the complementary markets in which it does not participate are more
competitive" (Economides, 2001: 212).
28 See Brusoni and Principe (2001) about the need for "tight cross-company interaction and
conscious efforts on coordination at the knowledge and organizational levels" that goes with
modular product architectures.
29 This could  raise the question if, for example, the other network’s members right to access
the vertical leader’s own technical information could be an effective measure for limiting the
latter’s power.
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successfully in market processes. Although most evolutionary economists would not deny that
rules for safeguarding competition are necessary, they have considerable doubts whether
competition authorities have the knowledge to assess the effects of particular market
structures or business behaviours sufficiently for making correct decisions in single
competition cases. Hayek and other evolutionary economists recommended that economic
policy should primarily be made in the form of applying general rules ("rule of law") instead
of attempting to intervene into the market on a case-by-case basis (Streit and Wegner,
1992).30 In US antitrust policy these two different approaches are well-known as the
application of "per se-rules", implying that certain behaviours are generally prohibited, versus
"rule of reason", which means that in a particular case the advantages and disadvantages have
to be balanced. From this evolutionary perspective the general tendency in European
competition policy, and particularly in regard to vertical restraints, to extend the application
of the "rule of reason" approach seems to be very problematic, because it presupposes an
amount of knowledge of competition authorities and firms, which both  will often not have.
Therefore, the policy for regulating vertical restraints should primarily consist of general
rules, and specific assessments in particular cases should at best be avoided.
A closely related problem from the perspective of evolutionary economics is that it is not
really possible to know in advance whether certain kinds of vertical restraints, and particularly
new vertical restraints due to organizational innovations, will lead to the expected efficiency
benefits. Finding out which vertical restraints are connected with positive efficiency effects,
requires itself an experimentation process. From an evolutionary point of view, the difficult
problem emerges that, on one side, any regulation restricts the scope for experimentation with
vertical restraints (which suggests deregulation), whereas, on the other side, vertical restraints
can also hamper market experimentation (as shown in section 4.2). Only careful analyses of
specific kinds of vertical restraints can solve this problem.
To what extent do the EU regulation of vertical restraints leave enough scope for
experimentation with vertical agreements? In this regard, one important problem emerges:
The EU Commission’s interpretation of Article 81 requires that the firm invoking Article 81
(3) knows in advance that the vertical restraint will have a significant positive impact in the
market. The recent Guidelines on the application of Article 81 (3) state that the firm must
demonstrate that the procompetitive gains of vertical arrangements are objective and
substantiated, so that they can be balanced against anticompetitive effects. In particular, the
firm has to describe the nature, likelihood and magnitude of each claimed efficiency and to
explain how and when each claimed efficiency would be achieved. This implies the risk that
only well-known practices are considered efficient, whereas for still unknown (and really
innovative) practices substantiated benefits could be very difficult to describe and explain.
In most cases, however, this is no real problem, because most vertical restraints fall within the
scope of the general Block Exemption on vertical agreements, which is characterized by
simple and clear rules. If the market shares of the firms are under 30%, all kinds of vertical
restraints are exempted from the prohibition of Art. 81(1) - with the exception of the small
number of clearly defined hard core restrictions, which are generally prohibited (per se-rule).
Within this "safe harbour", the firms are also free to experiment with new and unknown types
of vertical restraints, without having to substantiate the efficiency benefits ex-ante or ex-post.
                                                
30 For general analyses of the knowledge problems of economic policy and how to deal with
them, see the contributions in Pelikan and Wegner (2003), and Kerber (2004); see already
very early in regard to competition policy with the conclusion to apply only per se-rules
Hoppmann (1977).
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Thus, from an evolutionary perspective, the reform of the policy in regard to vertical restraints
in 1999 was a major progress compared to the former block exemptions.31 The much more
differentiated old block exemptions did not define such simple rules in form of a market share
criterion delineating a safe scope for experimentation, but prescribed in much more detail
what kinds of vertical restraints under which conditions could be allowed and which were
prohibited. This approach was vastly criticized as a strait jacket for vertical restraints, which
(1) impeded the best tailoring of vertical restraints to specific transaction and cooperation
problems, and (2) eliminated to a large extent the scope for experimentation with new vertical
restraints. However, outside the scope of application of the group exemption the above-
mentioned problem of the ex-ante substantiation of the efficiency benefits remains.
6. Conclusions
This paper analysed to what extent evolutionary theories of competition and innovation
economics can be used to derive additional, new criteria for the assessment of vertical
restraints. It was shown that Neo-Schumpeterian and Hayekian approaches to competition and
innovation economics as well as knowledge-based theories of the firm are capable to provide
a basis for a different framework for analyzing the impact of vertical agreements on market
processes over several vertically linked markets. Specific evolutionary arguments, such as
subjective and local knowledge, the heterogeneity of knowledge bases of firms,
communication and learning problems, the complementarity of knowledge, and the specific
problems of systemic innovations can contribute considerably to our understanding of the
impact of vertical restraints. A particularly important argument concerns the freedom to
experiment, because, as a precondition for variety, this freedom plays a crucial role for the
workability of innovation-generating market processes in vertically linked markets. As well as
experimentation with new vertical restraints can be necessary for organizational innovations,
vertical restraints can also lead to an impediment of innovative experimentation, leading to a
reduction of the extent of knowledge generation in competition.
The analysis was made against the background of the most recent reforms of EU competition
rules in regard to vertical restraints. The analysis of vertical restraints from an evolutionary
perspective is still too new and under-developed for being able to derive far-reaching
conclusions for EU competition policy. However, we are able to draw some preliminary
conclusions. Our results suggest that the innovation dimension should always be taken into
account for assessing vertical restraints, and the elaborated evolutionary arguments and
criteria should complement the so far dominating neoclassical ones. This might imply also
well- known trade-offs between static and dynamic efficiencies, e.g., balancing negative
effects through free-rider problems with positive effects through more experimentation. In
this respect, the evolutionary perspective also lends some theoretical support to the new
policy of the Commission in regard to vertical restraints in the motor vehicle sector by
favouring a greater independence of the car dealers in order to stimulate innovation in
distribution formats. Maintaining independence and flexibility in order to ensure the openness
for experimentation is an important general conclusion for competition policy. However, the
evolutionary perspective also emphasizes the knowledge problems of competition authorities
                                                
31 This does not preclude the criticism that it can be hardly substantiated by theoretical or
empirical research, why the critical market share is determined as 30% (and not 25% or 40%),
see also Boscheck (2000).
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and courts, leading to the insight that competition policies should rely as much as possible on
general rules instead of case-by-case assessments of the effects on competition.
In this paper we could only present an initial broad investigation, how evolutionary
approaches might be used for assessing vertical restraints in competition policy. This
innovative research should be deepened in several directions: The evolutionary arguments
should be analysed in much more detail. There should be studies on the overall effects of
particular kinds of vertical restraints. Particularly important is that an integrated framework of
assessment criteria is developed, which encompasses both neoclassical and evolutionary
arguments in regard to vertical restraints. Our research can also be seen as a contribution to
the more general problem, how the innovation dimension can be integrated into competition
policy in a more sufficient way. Insofar this study is part of a broader research project aiming
at scrutinizing the usefulness of evolutionary approaches to competition and innovation
economics for competition policy.
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